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Mirror the A’s and Twins models? That doesn’t compute.

A couple of days ago one reader commented how well the Brewers and Twins were doing on low payrolls.  Another reader stated he felt we should follow the A’s model while rebuilding with an emphasis on the draft and player development.  Both were nice ideas until you stop and look at why those clubs have recently been succesful.

Take the draft, for instance: 

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For the record, compensatory picks come from losing quality players, Elias ranked ”A” or “B” status acquired from the draft or in trades, to free agency.

When one organization has more than twice the number of first round picks (including the supplemental round) than another organization has over a significant period of time, I think it’s fair to assume they should have twice the impact depth (assets) in their organization.  

Now look at the chart above.. the A’s have had 25 first round picks in the last eleven years, the Twins 20, the Brewers 15.  Now think about that a second – over the last eleven years, the A’s have had the equivalent of 1.2 additional picks per year before the Pirates even made their second board selection;  the Twins 0.7;  the Brewers 0.3. 

Obviously each one of those organizations has a reinvestment strategy which is working.  The Rays haven’t been around long enough to evaluate their reinvestment strategy yet but look at their average draft position in the first round over those eleven years – 5th!  Wow.  The A’s and Twins have higher overall pick numbers because of the higher number of supplemental picks weighing them down. 

When you consider that the best pool of players to enter Major League Baseball comes primarily from the first year draft, and you realize that the cream of the crop typically goes in the first round or so, it’s pretty obvious what the resulting impact from the A’s strategy might be – impact players playing for their first six years then lost to free agency and replaced by another impact player plus another first round pick, and then the cycle begins anew.  If a hole develops in the system since they always take best available on the board, they make a trade to get a player under contract short-term with high enough value so when they lose him, they also get the extra draft pick.

It’s brilliant, and it’s being done by quite a few of the smaller market clubs in one form or another.

Now we keep hearing how the Pirates should follow the A’s and Twins models and that sounds great in theory, but in reality we won’t be in that position for another decade or so because of the lack of “A” players on our roster that we might lose to free agency.  Plus, we’ve already seen our ownership group refusing to spend for quality free agents to help jump-start that cycle.

But I think it is important to note that we were in such a position to start the cycle having had the ’best outfield’ in the game in 2007 with at least Bay, if not also with Nady and McLouth.  But instead of ownership investing by taking on the financial commitment to Bay and then losing him, we saw him traded off for players who aren’t likely to ever qualify for an “A” rating (Morris being the longshot possible exception).  The same was true of Marte, Grabow, and a few others under this new regime.

That is just one reason why some of the old timers around the Pirates are upset at current ownership – they had a chance to invest in the long-term product and they failed to do so.  Their financial losses having kept players like Bay would have eventually been made up in gate proceeds during the last couple of years, two additional years of control with Andrew McCutchen, and the additional first round player picked in 2010 when Bay walked.  All of those would have easily recaptured the Nuttings expense to Bay, not to mention the additional return from having had better results in the win/loss column.

Whether you agree with the Pirates strategy the last two years or not, we are watching Frank Coonelly and Neal Huntington attempting to position this franchise to build a cycle which will allow them to keep their young players for the full six years and then be lost to free agency or traded for higher impact youth.  Right now Huntington is attempting to figure out if Paul Maholm will take his game to the next level over the next two years in order to qualify as no less than a “B” rated player, or if Capps will remain there, or if Doumit ever makes it, as examples.

That being said, it sounds as if the Pirates strategy remains focused on continual salary dumping and not keeping their 3-6 players through contract.  Instead, they are trading them for what many categorize as questionable assets. 

At some point there has to be reinvestment and today’s post shows you briefly just one of those ways.  Until the Nuttings take that first step, we’re destined to remain a losing organization because other organizations have either implemented reinvestment strategies that are in a continuum cycle, or they have a ton of cash to blow.

We obviously don’t have either. 

But what we have gained are ownership bottom-line aiding ‘player control years’ instead. 

That’s the type of mentality which begets poor culture and/or challenges to the organization within the organization’s ranks.  See: Ian Snell, Perry Hill, and Rich Donnelly as three recent examples. Other examples of players who were on track to possibly help us begin a reinvestment cycle but fell off the cultural cliff before the Pirates might have a chance to recapture include Jack Wilson and Freddy Sanchez, which I believe necessitated their being traded.

We’re heading into the third year with this regime and we’re still not witnessing any investment outside of a couple  capital improvements, and even the extent of some of those like the Latin academy were questionable based on what was available, some suggest.  The high-risk high school arms we’ve taken in the draft are just about as worthless because of the attrition rate, although they might have a better chance of helping us than a brand spankin’ new academy that we refuse to spend money to place impact talent in.

Are we really making sound decisions?  Are we really heading in the right direction?  Or, is it possible we simply have new blinders on because of so many additions from the trades? 

Bobby Crosby signed.  Well, there you go.. see above.  We had Crosby in the system with Bixler, albeit I agree Crosby has significantly more upside with the glove.

Well, if he’s healthy and can play, that is.

Yawn.

Who would have guessed that we would be opening the 2010 season with Andy LaRoche as – perhaps – the best infield defender?  My-oh-my we have major problems.

Dejan at the Post-Gazette interviewed John Russell Wednesday and this exchange made the hair on the back of my neck stand up:

On placing on an expectation of winning on such an inexperienced roster:

I think they’re going to have to handle it. It’s time. There’s always going to be teaching going on with our staff, but it’s time. I think they got a taste of the majors, and now is the time to start gelling that atmosphere into winning.”  — emphasis by Bucco Blog

Yup.. when there is no other choice, I guess they will have to handle it. 

There was a blurb I read somewhere about the Pirates thinking they may keep Doumit through next year hoping his value increases.  Ok, I can understand that considering he’s averaged about +2 WAR the last three years while playing 50% of the time so a net yearly value of +1 to +1.5 WAR certainly seems like it could be beat.

But let me answer all that by saying this:  I think the probability of Doumit being dealt this winter is significantly higher than the probability of Doumit exceeding the +1.5 WAR value as a member of the 2010 Pittsburgh Pirates.

Git my drift?

Call[s] for Andy LaRoche?  Yeppers, seems Mr. LaRoche has at least one team who inquired for his services, although I hear Huntington basically said he isn’t available right now.  How about dem apples Mr. Hill? 

Did you know that 5% of every ticket sold (since 2001) goes into a ballpark maintenance and improvement fund for the Pirates to use to offset those expenses?  Let’s see, 15M tickets sold at an average cost of $20 the last nine years would mean somewhere around $15M has been put in that kitty.

Scouting Department: Going Backwards?

I’ve had numerous readers ask what happened to the Q&A with Scouting Director Greg Smith.  I decided against it.  For one, he hasn’t been as approachable as others in the new regime, and two, what can he possibly tell us.. that he just hired a brand spanking new area supervisor or two?

Our scouting department hasn’t taken off like I had hoped it would under Smith and Huntington.  In fact, it appears to be regressing if you believe what a few major league scouts are saying: 

“They lack experience in the lower levels.”

“Too raw.  Heading the wrong way.”

I’ve spoken about the challenges the Pirates are facing in their restructuring and nowhere is it more evident than in our scouting department.  On the player development side, Kyle Stark has been able to add some experienced guns along the way, but in scouting we’re adding guys left and right with zero experience to area positions.

Like Hal Morris.

Or Chris Kline.

Or Trevor Haley.

To give you a better idea of what I mean, those three rookies represent 19% of our area scouts and they are covering 31% of the entire country (16 states plus part of Canada). 

Almost every organization follows one unwritten rule in regards to hiring scouts – they want guys with three years under their belts – preferrably having worked in the local area they will be assigned to - before they are handed an area.  And there’s a good reason for those three years.. not only do they have a general idea of their job duties within that time, as well as a track record that can be evaluated by an organization, but the relationships they develop over that period of time are even more important.  

And sure, a guy like Hal Morris who was a player for years and years seems like a logical hire, but that doesn’t mean he can evaluate talent any better than your grandmother can. Plus, he’s been away from the game for eight years.  Haley was at least in the game.. he was an intern in the Rockies organization. And Kline was a writer for Baseball America when Smith tapped him in early 2008.

And that’s just three of the new guys.

Now you don’t have to be a rocket scientist to wonder why an organization that is rebuilding top to bottom would even consider hiring inexperienced scouts when the only way out of the hole is primarily through the draft. 

Of all places, on the job training shouldn’t be an acceptable option in our scouting department.  We just can’t keep going backwards in experience in area scouts every single year like we have the last five or six.  Bud Selig and numerous other top executives in the game all agree, scouts are the lifeblood of any good organization.

The Pirates?

“In scouting, we’re covering the United States. And, if you talk about a motivated scouting staff, because of what Frank and Bob Nutting did in increasing the scouting budget, our scouts go out there right now feeling no player is off limits. That results in scouts going the extra mile.”  — Neal Huntington as reported by the Post-Gazette January 23, 2009

Some believe Neal Huntington needs to perform a transfusion in a hurry.  I certainly join with them.

I’m taking a lot of heat from SF Giants fans for my suggested trade of Adam LaRoche for Jonathan Sanchez.  That’s understandable.. we always overvalue players on our own team.  But unless the Giants organization comes up with stupid money for a Manny, I don’t see where they will ever get a better middle order bat for such a risky player like Sanchez.

And one thing I don’t understand about Sabean’s position is, if he could have a LaRoche in a contract year where the guy is obviously going to play his heart out looking for big money after the season, coupled with the down economy and contract values falling, it seems to me they would benefit by taking on a one-year guy they felt they could sign and use a couple of years.

Like a LaRoche who matches up pretty good against the arms and parks in that division.

Is Bill Lajoie around to advise Frank Coonelly more than Neal Huntington? 

Join the misery club Houston Astros fans.  Are they in trouble this year, or what? 

Lots of folks asked if I had worked up swing-and-miss rates for more than the 2008 season.  No, not yet.  But I will and post the results showing each organization in a future post soon.

Two readers have joined on as moderators for Bucco Blog’s new forum opening in a week or so.  If you know phpbb a little and have some time to moderate, drop me an email using bb[ at ] bucco-blog.com.

Analyzing the Pittsburgh Pirates blueprint

Nearly every day I get an email that starts something like this: “Where are we going?”  I used to answer those with a simple response - we’re rebuilding and it’s going to take time.  But then I would typically get a reply saying something like “What do you mean rebuilding when we aren’t making any trades?” 

Casual fans just don’t get it like hard-core fans do, but recent statements by Neal Huntington, Frank Coonelly, and unquestionably in Larry Corrigan’s radio interview the other day, are now confusing even the hard-core fans.  So let’s take a look at the Pirates blueprint and see if that answers some of your questions.

Why the Pirates won’t admit to rebuilding

Because they aren’t, and they won’t be, at least not in the traditional sense.  I finally realized this the other day when I was communicating with one of the Pirates top brass.  After I hit the send button it dawned on me that my rational for thinking we were in a rebuilding mode was completely off base. 

When we hear the term rebuilding as fans we immediately jump to the conclusion there will be a fire sale.. you know, dump everyone you can and reload with youthful prospects.  In previous years with the Pirates and other franchises this was the case.  But as I mentioned the other day, baseball’s landscape has changed dramatically the last 18 months and, while it might have been feasible to have a fire sale in December 2006, it’s nearly impossible to do that now. 

Why?  Because the value of toolsy youth has skyrocketed beyond reasonableness.

Three years ago a club could have wrestled a Carl Crawford type of player away from a team like the Rays by taking on his big contract and giving back one or two toolsy prospects, but that’s nearly impossible any more.  Now an organization has to give up three or four 60+ score (out of 80) prospects PLUS eat the large contract.  The days of the Yankees or Red Sox dealing their better draft picks for guys like Crawford are gone unless an organization virtually wipes out the top level of their farm system.

And it’s only going to get worse.

So if we’re not rebuilding per se, what are we doing?

I suppose that’s best answered by another “R” word – restructuring.  First we saw this at the upper most levels of the organization when Kevin McClatchy stepped down and Bob Nutting took over.  Nutting took a year to evaluate the system and consult with his peers and then made the decision to restructure the balance of the organization starting with the hiring of Frank Coonelly. 

That was the biggest decision Nutting had and, while I think Coonelly was his man all along, I don’t believe it was for the reasons that garnered our attention as fans.  Sure, Coonelly could help Nutting save a few dollars with his arbitration background, and sure, Nutting would probably benefit financially by having an ex-MLB guy take the reins, but I don’t think that’s the main reason why Coonelly was hired.

Instead, I believe he had a different vision on how to turn this organization around.  We’ll call it “Frank’s Plan” from here on out.

Now I can’t speak for Coonelly because I haven’t even discussed this with him, and he’s free to leave us a comment below if he so desires, but we’ve all heard a few different media reports from credible sources that Huntington and Coonelly appear to be heading in different directions at times.  I believe professional tension exists between the two parties but I don’t believe it’s anything to write home to mom about, nor do I think there is any infighting between them.

Instead, Neal Huntington wants to command the restructuring as any GM would but Frank Coonelly just isn’t willing to let go of those reins – thus the difference of opinion that sometimes is played out in the press.  It’s not that Huntington and Coonelly are on different pages, it’s that Huntington wants traditional GM power and he doesn’t quite have it yet.

That’s also part of Frank’s Plan.

Traditional GM’s handle roster affairs and only go to the President or ownership for financial approvals.  True, when a franchise player like a Jason Bay is possibly going to be dealt, that’s different.  But day-to-day roster management is generally always handled exclusively by the GM without interference from the President or ownership except, as I said, for financial approval.  (I hear some of the front office types across baseball laughing at that last comment because there are a lot of owners who meddle.. have faith – keep reading.)

But in Pittsburgh, Frank Coonelly has added another layer to Neal Huntington’s ability to manage his roster – trade approval.  Maybe not in every case, but in most.

That’s also part of Frank’s Plan.

So now that the Pirates have taken two years to restructure the organization (January 2007 – January 2009) in what they ultimately called a culture change, we’re starting to see phase two of Franks Plan take root.

Surfing the waves

I’ve spoken here numerous times over the years about Jonah Keri’s fabulous article at Baseball Prospectus in 2002 called “The Success Cycle.”   There Keri outlined exactly where Dave Littlefield’s plan differed from Cam Bonifay’s and why Littlefield appeared to be heading in the wrong direction in his.

To what extent Littlefield was his own problem over all those years isn’t at issue here.  But notice how Frank’s Plan has so far paralleled Littlefield’s plan – dealing a couple of vets for some youth, locking up fan appealing players to longer term deals, and picking up a few pieces of worthy fruit here and there to help the current team. 

But there’s one notable difference in Frank’s Plan than from either Bonifay’s or Littlefield’s.. holes are being filled and tradable youth and veterans are staying put.

It appears Frank’s Plan is to let the current wave of players - Wilson, Sanchez, Doumit, McLouth, and Adam LaRoche – remain in place regardless of the cost or resulting wins for one benefit Bonifay and Littlefield never seemed to understand or could afford.. full development of the next wave. 

And based on what we’ve heard in the media from trade opportunities Neal Huntington has taken to Coonelly for approval the last two years that were ultimately shot down (Wilson times two, Bay to Cleveland, Maholm, Snell, Grabow, etc.), it appears Huntington doesn’t understand Frank’s Plan either.   I mean, on the surface it doesn’t make a bit of sense just as Keri alluded to – either you commit to a full rebuild or you ultimately end up with a disaster.

But in reality it’s the first time in two decades anything our front office has done that does make sense.

Breaking down the blueprint on each wave

Frank’s Plan requires that current holes in Pittsburgh be filled first, then the next wave’s holes filled second, and then a third wave developed behind that as we saw by the selection of the risky but talented Bryan Morris in the Bay trade and the drafting of riskier high school products in Robbie Grossman and Quinton Miller.

The first wave can easily be defined as the current core group of Pirates that make up the 25-man roster.   One theory why Wilson wasn’t dealt is because Frank’s Plan won’t allow a hole to go unfilled unless a reasonable youthful replacement is found, especially a critical position like the left side middle infield for the Bucs. 

Huntington couldn’t find one so Wilson remains a Buc.  And no, Frank’s Plan doesn’t allow a utility or below average player (perhaps as projected by the Pirates pro scouts?, although I do know Coonelly can break down players pretty good himself) to assume the duties unless that is the result after a trade is made which ultimately makes this organization better overall.

The second wave includes the balance of the 40-man not on the active roster plus just about anyone in 2A and up.  But more specifically by each position:  a hole at first base possibly filled by either Andy LaRoche or Pedro Alvarez with the other player remaining on the other corner, Shelby Ford at second, perhaps Brian Friday at short (though a bit early to declare him), Jose Tabata in left, Andrew McCutchen in center, perhaps Brandon Moss in right, and maybe Ryan Doumit catching the first couple of years of this wave, although I see a hole at this position myself. 

That wave is scheduled to begin no later than 2011 and will probably also include starting pitchers Tom Gorzelanny and Paul Maholm (signed to five year deals in 2009?), any graduates of the Joe Kerrigan two-year school of pitching (Karstens, Ohlendorf, McCutchen, Lincoln, McSwain, Barthmaier, Beam, and Meek are likely candidates), plus any possible advanced top draft pick in 2009.

Then the third wave will start pushing to shore around 2014 – 2015 hopefully providing the depth needed for a consistent run in the division year-in and year-out. 

Get it?  Right, it’s actually very simple and exactly what Ed Creech/Dave Littlefield and Cam Bonifay/Mickey White were doing all their years but didn’t have the financial luxury to continue playing higher priced dead weight in Pittsburgh so the next wave could continue to develop.

The risks

Mickey White was no fool, and by most standards Ed Creech and his lowly paid foot soldiers didn’t do too bad a job either contrary to public opinion.  Unfortunately, player development failed both men not to mention many of their riskier picks led to too many bad luck flameouts.

We’re still at risk for these types of drafting errors/problems because we have, by most accounts, too many unproven foot soldiers at the area level.  As I was recently told, most clubs like to place area scouts with no less than three years of proven experience under their belts, but we’re not there yet in some important parts of the country. 

Throw in the fact our scouting department took a significant hit several years ago when this organization had a hard time coughing up payroll for their scouts, and to say we lost ground from the associate scout level up from China to the US would be an understatement. 

Frank Coonelly is doing what he can to try and change that sentiment in the industry with  increased cash flow to the department, Neal Huntington is placing more emphasis on the voices in each region as evidenced by the last draft, and even little things like Coonelly passing out water on hot days to advance scouts working at PNC during the year is making a difference.  Trust me, scouts are talking about all this.

But it’s going to take time.. it’s going to take a lot of time.. to alter the mindset of those foot soldiers in this game who are true difference makers we might like to employ by giving life changing money to, because they still won’t come.

As for player development, I covered that in December by basically saying that it’s nice we have weeded out the cultural problems, it’s nice that we have a new blueprint, and it’s nice that Stark is working passionately 24/7/365.  That’s a huge start which will begin to show up more in the third wave than we’ll notice in the second wave. 

But there are still glaring problems in PD. 

For one, we seem to be hiring too many temporary stopgaps like quality field staff being hired on one year deals.  That reduces productivity, reduces cohesiveness within the system, and continues the mentality that Pittsburgh is a place to hang out waiting for a better gig.

And two, Kyle Stark has handed way too much power to his rovers.  If you read my blog you know I’ve touched on this during the last year and Stark is adamant his system’s approach is the best way, but in some folks eyes there’s already been too much damage inflicted both inside and outside the system with the power his rovers are commanding. 

Typically when a rover visits a minor league team in most other organizations they listen to the field staff, do their work with the players and their plans, and then observe.  They don’t take out bullhorns and take over like we’re seeing in our system.  Perhaps this will be toned down some this year with the hiring of some more professional help 2A and up. We’ll have to see.

Lastly, as we all know it comes down to tools in this game and the Pirates have taken some positive steps forward trying to find that talent outside the draft like the new academy in the Dominican Republic and spending more time outside the US looking at potential talent. 

Ultimately impact talent outside the draft is going to primarily come from trades so it’s up to Neal Huntington and his advisors to find that talent when the opportunity presents itself, and as well as Frank Coonelly’s willingness to let Huntington pull the trigger.  So far Frank’s Plan has been to keep a light touch on the trigger, for better or for worse.

Conclusion

First and foremost don’t ever forget you are watching The Frank Coonelly Show here in Pittsburgh.  Before Frank it was the Kevin McClatchy Show.  From all the sources that I have reached, it appears the Nuttings are not, and never have been, involved in any micromanaging as I have suspected.

That being said, there are still a lot of holes in our processes as well as in the prospect waves building offshore, as noted above.  While we have patched quite a few of the holes and this ship is back afloat, it’s only just treading water.  As Keri noted, Frank’s Plan is risky in that he’s not selling a full rebuild like Branch Rickey did here in the 50’s, and if we’re at the same position in two years we were two years ago, it’s going to be a lot easier to see.

Plus, 2009 is a defining year for this franchise in many ways.  If the Pirates draw 1.4 million fans or less and/or lose 100 games, ownership is going to be put in a precarious position as many needed revenue streams are all but sure to dry up until the next wave hits Pittsburgh.

Ownership knows that better than anyone and that’s why they handed the reins to Frank.  It’s his baby, sink or swim, although this ownership is probably going to be very quick to pull the rug out if the ship starts to sink too much.

Stage three of Frank’s Plan?  .500 baseball riding the surf year-in and year-out.  I’m betting in his heart he wants it in 2011, will settle for 2012, but probably realizes his cycle begins in earnest in 2013.

Will that be too late? And will Frank’s Plan even work at all? 

Good questions.. tough questions.  On paper it all seems so simple.