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Paul Maholm's contract: panic time?

(Edited on March 8, 2009, to show how ridiculously high the Maholm contract really is.)

I’m starting to seriously wonder if the Pirates new regime has a long-term plan in place.  The short-term one is easy to see - sign any first-year arbitration eligible player of value to a three year contract.  Beyond that, everything else is fuzzy.  Let me show you what I mean.

The chart below is a crude attempt to extract data from my project software to show you where the Pirates are in their long-term cycle.  This is based on my own player value assumptions as of the end of the 2008 season so that’s why you don’t see Karstens, Ohlendorf, and several other players I personally don’t believe hold long-term value. Plus, I used my assumptions to fill in some slots to give you some sense of where and when players come and go.  You can make the same chart at home and plug in the players and time frames you like, just be sure to carry forward the known contracts. 

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No matter which names you plug in, or where you plug them in, when you throw in the Pirates current short-term model you get a jumbled long-term mess (four years plus out). 

Consider this.. what is the probability Sanchez and Wilson will still be here in 2011?  Right, pretty close to zero.  So plug in two middle infield rookies starting at least by 2011.  And at some point McCutchen, Alvarez, and Tabata are going to come up so plug those rookies in too.

Starting to get a feel for it?  That sure is one heck of a lot of rookies running around behind our “veteran” pitchers the next couple of years, and at critical positions too.  So if the Pirates are going to start getting more competitive along the way, they either have to do it before the entire defense becomes rookie’ville, or before all the starters we have with any experience leave.

Take a minute and chart it out using your own players, then come back and read the rest of this.

Right, the long-term plan is becoming more fragmented with every three-year contract signed.  The Pirates emphasis doesn’t appear to be in building a long-term plan, the emphasis is in signing arbitration eligible players at their lowest cost value in their first year of arb.  In other words, all we are seeing in the short-term plan is the Pirates leveraging their position to keep payroll as low as possible every year.

Not in building a long-term competitive club.

The Pirates often mention the Brewers as a model they like but they rarely offer multiple year deals until the second year of arb and almost always lock up key youth for numerous years to include two free agent years plus like Ryan Braun (8 years, $45M) and Bill Hall (4 years, $24M plus one club option year), whereas other youth wait for a deal at least through their first arb year like Hardy, Bush, Coffey, and McClung.  Fielder is the obvious exception to the rule.

Look around the game.. it’s not just the Brewers, almost all of the teams lock up key players long-term buying multiple free agent years.  With position players it’s a bit easier than pitchers who break down more often, but clubs do offer multiple club option years to pitchers to keep them in-house, and rarely do they offer a multiple year deal until their second year of arb. 

That’s just smart long-term business sense.

Not the Pirates.  And the only one we did offer it to (or if we offered, the only one to accept) was Ryan Doumit who agreeed to the two club option years as long as the Pirates exercised them both in one year.  How bizarre was that?

Our long-term model is taking a hit with these three-year, first arb year deals. I understand we can ask the player for additional years later down the road but that’s a risk we shouldn’t be assuming.  Throw in Alvarez’s bizarre six-years-and-I-plan-to-run-so-fast-it-makes-your-head-spin MLB deal, and we’re not getting anywhere. 

Until this organization starts thinking long-term, agents and players are going to continue to refuse to buy in resulting in first year draft picks gone in six years, key players signing away no more than one free agent year (which is when we deal them making it useless anyway), and player production tanking the year after they get their big money deals.  It’s a dysfunctional cycle that has gone on too long and has to be broke.

That was what I expected as a fan from Frank Coonelly being hired.  So far it’s not working for anyone but the Nutting family.

Scouting Department: Going Backwards?

I’ve had numerous readers ask what happened to the Q&A with Scouting Director Greg Smith.  I decided against it.  For one, he hasn’t been as approachable as others in the new regime, and two, what can he possibly tell us.. that he just hired a brand spanking new area supervisor or two?

Our scouting department hasn’t taken off like I had hoped it would under Smith and Huntington.  In fact, it appears to be regressing if you believe what a few major league scouts are saying: 

“They lack experience in the lower levels.”

“Too raw.  Heading the wrong way.”

I’ve spoken about the challenges the Pirates are facing in their restructuring and nowhere is it more evident than in our scouting department.  On the player development side, Kyle Stark has been able to add some experienced guns along the way, but in scouting we’re adding guys left and right with zero experience to area positions.

Like Hal Morris.

Or Chris Kline.

Or Trevor Haley.

To give you a better idea of what I mean, those three rookies represent 19% of our area scouts and they are covering 31% of the entire country (16 states plus part of Canada). 

Almost every organization follows one unwritten rule in regards to hiring scouts – they want guys with three years under their belts – preferrably having worked in the local area they will be assigned to - before they are handed an area.  And there’s a good reason for those three years.. not only do they have a general idea of their job duties within that time, as well as a track record that can be evaluated by an organization, but the relationships they develop over that period of time are even more important.  

And sure, a guy like Hal Morris who was a player for years and years seems like a logical hire, but that doesn’t mean he can evaluate talent any better than your grandmother can. Plus, he’s been away from the game for eight years.  Haley was at least in the game.. he was an intern in the Rockies organization. And Kline was a writer for Baseball America when Smith tapped him in early 2008.

And that’s just three of the new guys.

Now you don’t have to be a rocket scientist to wonder why an organization that is rebuilding top to bottom would even consider hiring inexperienced scouts when the only way out of the hole is primarily through the draft. 

Of all places, on the job training shouldn’t be an acceptable option in our scouting department.  We just can’t keep going backwards in experience in area scouts every single year like we have the last five or six.  Bud Selig and numerous other top executives in the game all agree, scouts are the lifeblood of any good organization.

The Pirates?

“In scouting, we’re covering the United States. And, if you talk about a motivated scouting staff, because of what Frank and Bob Nutting did in increasing the scouting budget, our scouts go out there right now feeling no player is off limits. That results in scouts going the extra mile.”  — Neal Huntington as reported by the Post-Gazette January 23, 2009

Some believe Neal Huntington needs to perform a transfusion in a hurry.  I certainly join with them.

I’m taking a lot of heat from SF Giants fans for my suggested trade of Adam LaRoche for Jonathan Sanchez.  That’s understandable.. we always overvalue players on our own team.  But unless the Giants organization comes up with stupid money for a Manny, I don’t see where they will ever get a better middle order bat for such a risky player like Sanchez.

And one thing I don’t understand about Sabean’s position is, if he could have a LaRoche in a contract year where the guy is obviously going to play his heart out looking for big money after the season, coupled with the down economy and contract values falling, it seems to me they would benefit by taking on a one-year guy they felt they could sign and use a couple of years.

Like a LaRoche who matches up pretty good against the arms and parks in that division.

Is Bill Lajoie around to advise Frank Coonelly more than Neal Huntington? 

Join the misery club Houston Astros fans.  Are they in trouble this year, or what? 

Lots of folks asked if I had worked up swing-and-miss rates for more than the 2008 season.  No, not yet.  But I will and post the results showing each organization in a future post soon.

Two readers have joined on as moderators for Bucco Blog’s new forum opening in a week or so.  If you know phpbb a little and have some time to moderate, drop me an email using bb[ at ] bucco-blog.com.

Analyzing the Pittsburgh Pirates blueprint

Nearly every day I get an email that starts something like this: “Where are we going?”  I used to answer those with a simple response - we’re rebuilding and it’s going to take time.  But then I would typically get a reply saying something like “What do you mean rebuilding when we aren’t making any trades?” 

Casual fans just don’t get it like hard-core fans do, but recent statements by Neal Huntington, Frank Coonelly, and unquestionably in Larry Corrigan’s radio interview the other day, are now confusing even the hard-core fans.  So let’s take a look at the Pirates blueprint and see if that answers some of your questions.

Why the Pirates won’t admit to rebuilding

Because they aren’t, and they won’t be, at least not in the traditional sense.  I finally realized this the other day when I was communicating with one of the Pirates top brass.  After I hit the send button it dawned on me that my rational for thinking we were in a rebuilding mode was completely off base. 

When we hear the term rebuilding as fans we immediately jump to the conclusion there will be a fire sale.. you know, dump everyone you can and reload with youthful prospects.  In previous years with the Pirates and other franchises this was the case.  But as I mentioned the other day, baseball’s landscape has changed dramatically the last 18 months and, while it might have been feasible to have a fire sale in December 2006, it’s nearly impossible to do that now. 

Why?  Because the value of toolsy youth has skyrocketed beyond reasonableness.

Three years ago a club could have wrestled a Carl Crawford type of player away from a team like the Rays by taking on his big contract and giving back one or two toolsy prospects, but that’s nearly impossible any more.  Now an organization has to give up three or four 60+ score (out of 80) prospects PLUS eat the large contract.  The days of the Yankees or Red Sox dealing their better draft picks for guys like Crawford are gone unless an organization virtually wipes out the top level of their farm system.

And it’s only going to get worse.

So if we’re not rebuilding per se, what are we doing?

I suppose that’s best answered by another “R” word – restructuring.  First we saw this at the upper most levels of the organization when Kevin McClatchy stepped down and Bob Nutting took over.  Nutting took a year to evaluate the system and consult with his peers and then made the decision to restructure the balance of the organization starting with the hiring of Frank Coonelly. 

That was the biggest decision Nutting had and, while I think Coonelly was his man all along, I don’t believe it was for the reasons that garnered our attention as fans.  Sure, Coonelly could help Nutting save a few dollars with his arbitration background, and sure, Nutting would probably benefit financially by having an ex-MLB guy take the reins, but I don’t think that’s the main reason why Coonelly was hired.

Instead, I believe he had a different vision on how to turn this organization around.  We’ll call it “Frank’s Plan” from here on out.

Now I can’t speak for Coonelly because I haven’t even discussed this with him, and he’s free to leave us a comment below if he so desires, but we’ve all heard a few different media reports from credible sources that Huntington and Coonelly appear to be heading in different directions at times.  I believe professional tension exists between the two parties but I don’t believe it’s anything to write home to mom about, nor do I think there is any infighting between them.

Instead, Neal Huntington wants to command the restructuring as any GM would but Frank Coonelly just isn’t willing to let go of those reins – thus the difference of opinion that sometimes is played out in the press.  It’s not that Huntington and Coonelly are on different pages, it’s that Huntington wants traditional GM power and he doesn’t quite have it yet.

That’s also part of Frank’s Plan.

Traditional GM’s handle roster affairs and only go to the President or ownership for financial approvals.  True, when a franchise player like a Jason Bay is possibly going to be dealt, that’s different.  But day-to-day roster management is generally always handled exclusively by the GM without interference from the President or ownership except, as I said, for financial approval.  (I hear some of the front office types across baseball laughing at that last comment because there are a lot of owners who meddle.. have faith – keep reading.)

But in Pittsburgh, Frank Coonelly has added another layer to Neal Huntington’s ability to manage his roster – trade approval.  Maybe not in every case, but in most.

That’s also part of Frank’s Plan.

So now that the Pirates have taken two years to restructure the organization (January 2007 – January 2009) in what they ultimately called a culture change, we’re starting to see phase two of Franks Plan take root.

Surfing the waves

I’ve spoken here numerous times over the years about Jonah Keri’s fabulous article at Baseball Prospectus in 2002 called “The Success Cycle.”   There Keri outlined exactly where Dave Littlefield’s plan differed from Cam Bonifay’s and why Littlefield appeared to be heading in the wrong direction in his.

To what extent Littlefield was his own problem over all those years isn’t at issue here.  But notice how Frank’s Plan has so far paralleled Littlefield’s plan – dealing a couple of vets for some youth, locking up fan appealing players to longer term deals, and picking up a few pieces of worthy fruit here and there to help the current team. 

But there’s one notable difference in Frank’s Plan than from either Bonifay’s or Littlefield’s.. holes are being filled and tradable youth and veterans are staying put.

It appears Frank’s Plan is to let the current wave of players - Wilson, Sanchez, Doumit, McLouth, and Adam LaRoche – remain in place regardless of the cost or resulting wins for one benefit Bonifay and Littlefield never seemed to understand or could afford.. full development of the next wave. 

And based on what we’ve heard in the media from trade opportunities Neal Huntington has taken to Coonelly for approval the last two years that were ultimately shot down (Wilson times two, Bay to Cleveland, Maholm, Snell, Grabow, etc.), it appears Huntington doesn’t understand Frank’s Plan either.   I mean, on the surface it doesn’t make a bit of sense just as Keri alluded to – either you commit to a full rebuild or you ultimately end up with a disaster.

But in reality it’s the first time in two decades anything our front office has done that does make sense.

Breaking down the blueprint on each wave

Frank’s Plan requires that current holes in Pittsburgh be filled first, then the next wave’s holes filled second, and then a third wave developed behind that as we saw by the selection of the risky but talented Bryan Morris in the Bay trade and the drafting of riskier high school products in Robbie Grossman and Quinton Miller.

The first wave can easily be defined as the current core group of Pirates that make up the 25-man roster.   One theory why Wilson wasn’t dealt is because Frank’s Plan won’t allow a hole to go unfilled unless a reasonable youthful replacement is found, especially a critical position like the left side middle infield for the Bucs. 

Huntington couldn’t find one so Wilson remains a Buc.  And no, Frank’s Plan doesn’t allow a utility or below average player (perhaps as projected by the Pirates pro scouts?, although I do know Coonelly can break down players pretty good himself) to assume the duties unless that is the result after a trade is made which ultimately makes this organization better overall.

The second wave includes the balance of the 40-man not on the active roster plus just about anyone in 2A and up.  But more specifically by each position:  a hole at first base possibly filled by either Andy LaRoche or Pedro Alvarez with the other player remaining on the other corner, Shelby Ford at second, perhaps Brian Friday at short (though a bit early to declare him), Jose Tabata in left, Andrew McCutchen in center, perhaps Brandon Moss in right, and maybe Ryan Doumit catching the first couple of years of this wave, although I see a hole at this position myself. 

That wave is scheduled to begin no later than 2011 and will probably also include starting pitchers Tom Gorzelanny and Paul Maholm (signed to five year deals in 2009?), any graduates of the Joe Kerrigan two-year school of pitching (Karstens, Ohlendorf, McCutchen, Lincoln, McSwain, Barthmaier, Beam, and Meek are likely candidates), plus any possible advanced top draft pick in 2009.

Then the third wave will start pushing to shore around 2014 – 2015 hopefully providing the depth needed for a consistent run in the division year-in and year-out. 

Get it?  Right, it’s actually very simple and exactly what Ed Creech/Dave Littlefield and Cam Bonifay/Mickey White were doing all their years but didn’t have the financial luxury to continue playing higher priced dead weight in Pittsburgh so the next wave could continue to develop.

The risks

Mickey White was no fool, and by most standards Ed Creech and his lowly paid foot soldiers didn’t do too bad a job either contrary to public opinion.  Unfortunately, player development failed both men not to mention many of their riskier picks led to too many bad luck flameouts.

We’re still at risk for these types of drafting errors/problems because we have, by most accounts, too many unproven foot soldiers at the area level.  As I was recently told, most clubs like to place area scouts with no less than three years of proven experience under their belts, but we’re not there yet in some important parts of the country. 

Throw in the fact our scouting department took a significant hit several years ago when this organization had a hard time coughing up payroll for their scouts, and to say we lost ground from the associate scout level up from China to the US would be an understatement. 

Frank Coonelly is doing what he can to try and change that sentiment in the industry with  increased cash flow to the department, Neal Huntington is placing more emphasis on the voices in each region as evidenced by the last draft, and even little things like Coonelly passing out water on hot days to advance scouts working at PNC during the year is making a difference.  Trust me, scouts are talking about all this.

But it’s going to take time.. it’s going to take a lot of time.. to alter the mindset of those foot soldiers in this game who are true difference makers we might like to employ by giving life changing money to, because they still won’t come.

As for player development, I covered that in December by basically saying that it’s nice we have weeded out the cultural problems, it’s nice that we have a new blueprint, and it’s nice that Stark is working passionately 24/7/365.  That’s a huge start which will begin to show up more in the third wave than we’ll notice in the second wave. 

But there are still glaring problems in PD. 

For one, we seem to be hiring too many temporary stopgaps like quality field staff being hired on one year deals.  That reduces productivity, reduces cohesiveness within the system, and continues the mentality that Pittsburgh is a place to hang out waiting for a better gig.

And two, Kyle Stark has handed way too much power to his rovers.  If you read my blog you know I’ve touched on this during the last year and Stark is adamant his system’s approach is the best way, but in some folks eyes there’s already been too much damage inflicted both inside and outside the system with the power his rovers are commanding. 

Typically when a rover visits a minor league team in most other organizations they listen to the field staff, do their work with the players and their plans, and then observe.  They don’t take out bullhorns and take over like we’re seeing in our system.  Perhaps this will be toned down some this year with the hiring of some more professional help 2A and up. We’ll have to see.

Lastly, as we all know it comes down to tools in this game and the Pirates have taken some positive steps forward trying to find that talent outside the draft like the new academy in the Dominican Republic and spending more time outside the US looking at potential talent. 

Ultimately impact talent outside the draft is going to primarily come from trades so it’s up to Neal Huntington and his advisors to find that talent when the opportunity presents itself, and as well as Frank Coonelly’s willingness to let Huntington pull the trigger.  So far Frank’s Plan has been to keep a light touch on the trigger, for better or for worse.

Conclusion

First and foremost don’t ever forget you are watching The Frank Coonelly Show here in Pittsburgh.  Before Frank it was the Kevin McClatchy Show.  From all the sources that I have reached, it appears the Nuttings are not, and never have been, involved in any micromanaging as I have suspected.

That being said, there are still a lot of holes in our processes as well as in the prospect waves building offshore, as noted above.  While we have patched quite a few of the holes and this ship is back afloat, it’s only just treading water.  As Keri noted, Frank’s Plan is risky in that he’s not selling a full rebuild like Branch Rickey did here in the 50’s, and if we’re at the same position in two years we were two years ago, it’s going to be a lot easier to see.

Plus, 2009 is a defining year for this franchise in many ways.  If the Pirates draw 1.4 million fans or less and/or lose 100 games, ownership is going to be put in a precarious position as many needed revenue streams are all but sure to dry up until the next wave hits Pittsburgh.

Ownership knows that better than anyone and that’s why they handed the reins to Frank.  It’s his baby, sink or swim, although this ownership is probably going to be very quick to pull the rug out if the ship starts to sink too much.

Stage three of Frank’s Plan?  .500 baseball riding the surf year-in and year-out.  I’m betting in his heart he wants it in 2011, will settle for 2012, but probably realizes his cycle begins in earnest in 2013.

Will that be too late? And will Frank’s Plan even work at all? 

Good questions.. tough questions.  On paper it all seems so simple.

Planning the next success cycle

Ok we’re rebuilding – we all know that even though the guys on Federal Street refuse to utter the word.  So where are we headed?

Consider this – we’ll have new field staff groupings at every level of our farm system in 2009; we have a new infield instructor in Perry Hill who surely wasn’t brought in to instruct middle infielders who are on the wrong side of 30; we have yet another brand spanking new pitching coach who hasn’t even been in the game the last couple of years, although he’s certainly qualified; half of Huntington’s lieutenants are new to the organization and a couple of the guys that are still around seem a little less dialed in, if that makes any sense to you; and we’ve lost some amateur scouts down in the ranks.  Plus, as we all know, there hasn’t exactly been a huge influx of impact talent so far.

So how in the world could this possibly mean we’re moving forward?  Right, it doesn’t.  

Two years ago I pointed my readers to an excellent article penned by Jonah Keri at Baseball Prospectus (free read) in 2002 called “The Success Cycle.”  Keri was talking about the Pirates where he said in part:

“Dave Littlefield had an opportunity to make an immediate impact after being hired as the Pirates’ general manager last June. He could have traded Jason Kendall and Brian Giles to contending teams for a bushel of top prospects and started a new era in Pittsburgh baseball.  He didn’t do that, of course, and now the Bucs enter spring training with the same problems they faced a year ago. ..  Recognizing a team’s place in the cycle is perhaps the key element in any team’s game plan, because it drives decision-making.”

It wasn’t a novel thought Keri had – he was just the first person in a larger media format to openly discuss where Dave Littlefield may have made a strategic mistake.  Many of us that posted in the discussion forum at pirateball.com during that time already knew we were headed in the wrong direction but we weren’t close enough to know how bad Littlefield misjudged his system.

Boy have we grown up as fans since.

Today the obvious question to ask is, did Neal Huntington misjudge his system as bad as Littlefield?  The obvious answer is no - there was nothing in the system to misjudge.  So what else could Huntington do except to get younger?  That was the right move. 

Instead, the debate has to begin in the type of players Huntington received back – two potential toolsy products buried in the system and the rest MLB ready guys.  Where exactly do these players fit in his cycle plan?

Then the debate should jump to whether or not it is possible Huntington misjudged the quality of the players he did receive, especially the toolsy buried players in Tabata and Morris.  If he did, then by all accounts he gave away Bay and Nady and did no better than Dave Littlefield making no trades at all.

Lastly the debate should turn to ‘the plan’ and where the Pirates truly are in building a success cycle.  For instance there’s been a lot of questions asked about Andy LaRoche… will he be cost prohibitive in 2011?  Or how about Brandon Moss?  For that matter, how about Nate McLouth, Ian Snell, Ryan Doumit, John Grabow, Matt Capps, and Paul Maholm in 2010?  2011?  Or 2012?  Or even Adam LaRoche in 2009?

Where in that plan is the core we should build around?  If you said the younger core of Tabata, Morris, Lincoln, Ford, McCutchen, et al, I agree.  So in your plan, who do you keep from today’s 25-man roster to compliment that younger group down the road?  And more importantly today, who do you deal to try and add more impact and depth to that younger core while at the same time respecting Bob Nutting’s desire to sell tickets and field as competitive a product as possible?

I’ve already stated some of my own ideas… minimally, deal McLouth right now and let it be known Doumit could be had this year for the right price.  Dealing Wilson and Sanchez for more than a can of beans is a no-brainer as well, although probably not until July.  I’m sure you have some ideas of your own.

Now that this is finally the official “Neal Huntington Show,” what he does with the current 25-man roster to build around the young core group is going to be crucial to the success cycle we’ve started to build.  Will he sign guys to long-term deals trying to keep some pieces around, or will he continue to deal our roster for youth? 

The correct answer to me is pretty obvious.  Just ask Keri.

The Royals payroll is projected to jump to around $70M and, by the tone of recent emails, Pirates fans are livid why we won’t spend a dime to bring in talent.  If you read everything above you already know why – it won’t bring us back enough wins to justify the money spent.  We’re just not at the same place in time the Royals are.  We should be, but we’re not.

Quick mailbag:

Now here’s an interesting question from a twelve-year-old Pirates fan:

How much effect do wireless transmissions have on a ball in play?”  JA, Pittsburgh

Now that’s good stuff.  Jeremy, I suspect little to none but since I’m not a physicist I asked the question to one. Here’s his answer:

“Based on general principles and a gut-level instinct, I would say that the idea that the flight of the ball is affected by these transmissions is nonsense.”

Here’s a set of three questions recently asked by JB (of Pittsburgh?):

1.  Some of your recent comments seem to suggest you are a little higher on Andy LaRoche than you were at the time of the Bay trade.  Is this a fair characterization, and if so, why the change of heart?  What kind of production do you expect over the next few years.”

First some perspective – LaRoche had labrum surgery in 2006, mild wrist problems in 2007, and a torn UCL in his throwing hand in 2008.  My thought at the time he was acquired was that he was of minimal value to the Pirates in the short-term plus already had one year of service in the bigs and therefore we’ll eventually see very little return for what we gave up. 

However, that didn’t mean I didn’t like LaRoche.  In fact, I dropped his name on some Pirates front office people before the deadline because I felt there was some potential in the young man. At the time I was thinking more of a Grabow package for LaRoche thinking he was still less than 80% healthy and the Dodgers needed pen help. Unfortunately as we found out, Grabow wasn’t any healthier than LaRoche and I assume most clubs knew it.

I look for a tick better offensive performance from him in 2009, and I think he’s going to do a lot better than most fantasy projections will suggest, but I’m not going to expect much more than an .800 OPS (think Alex Gorden of the Royals with a tick more power and a few less walks). 

He’s only seen 1,200 or so pitches so far and has a lot of work to do on his swing before I’ll get much more excited.  But if his thumb is 100%, his shoulder remains healthy, and the young man comes to camp hungry to learn and in shape, I think he has a chance to put up NL league average production over the next couple of years.

If he generates a breakout year, I think it will be in the 2011/2012 era and I doubt seriously it will be with the Bucs unless he’s playing RF for us with the addition of Alvarez and now Perry Hill to guide him.

2.  Any hope for Neil Walker to develop?  His stats were poor, but at the same time, his BABIP was very low (.275) for a guy with a 20% line drive rate.  Seems like some bad luck certainly brought down his numbers, unless I am missing something.  And are you hearing the same positive reviews of his defense that Baseball America apparently heard?

I agree – one thing I personally like about Walker is that he drives the ball.  Unfortunately, he doesn’t do very much else. His plate discipline has been horrid and I’m sure he knows he needs to generate more walks to go with his free-swinging nature. But as you said, there was some bad luck despite having an 81% contact rate last year with a 20% line drive rate, as his wOBA was some .30 points lower than league average.  Ouch. 

As for BA’s ears to the ground on Walker’s defensive strides, I don’t share their final evaluation thoughts.  I do believe he’s done an exceptional job in the transition, and I do believe he’s of the right mold, but I don’t think he’s anywhere near as solid as some are reporting.  I have him as fringy on D.

3.  Let’s be optimistic for a second and pretend that Andy LaRoche, Neil Walker, and Pedro Alvarez all end up having at least enough glove and bat to play 3rd for the Pirates.  Who sticks at third and where do the other guys end up?  Does Walker (or either of the others) have enough athleticism for 2nd?

Alvarez sticks.  Alvarez HAS to stick.  Plus his tools are significantly superior to either LaRoche or Walker.  I can see Andy LaRoche in RF down the line if he starts listening to his hitting instructor along the way, and sure, I can see Walker as a possible second base candidate, but that’s probably unlikely.  I think Walker would be dealt before he’s moved.  Look for the Bucs to keep him at third to keep his value higher and, perhaps, maybe even get some innings out of him back behind the dish again.  Just a guess thinking they will want to keep his value as high as possible.